Legal prism — 2026-10-28

Under CC Article 6.256(2), a person who improperly performs a contractual obligation must compensate the other party for the losses incurred, and under CC Article 6.256(4), the company is liable in all cases unless it proves force majeure.

Under CC Article 6.667(1), a one-year limitation period applies to claims regarding defects in work performed, and under Article 23(2) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, the consumer may apply to the body examining disputes no later than one year after approaching the service provider.

Core issue

In the case of the Estonian service provider "GarazTervis OÜ", the legal situation does not end with the Commission's decision — the company faces an obligation to pay compensation of EUR 1,677.84, and the dispute can still be transferred to the district court, where the same contract-for-work norms would be assessed. The precise legal issue is whether a repair company is liable for a defective spare part and an unsuitable replacement engine where the consumer concluded a consumer contract for work with it. This is resolved under Article 6.644 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania (CC) (the concept of a contract for work), CC Article 6.665 (the contractor's liability for work of improper quality) and CC Article 6.256 (the basis of contractual liability), while the procedural aspect is governed by Article 23 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection.

Legal assessment

Under CC Article 6.644(1), the contractor performs the work at its own risk and must deliver a result fit for use according to its intended purpose. In this case, the service provider's obligations arising therefrom are as follows:

• to procure and install a spare part suitable for the vehicle and compliant with the requirements — in the Commission's assessment, a defect in the manufacturer's part does not exonerate the service provider, since the client's contract is with the company, not with the part's manufacturer;
• before installing the replacement engine, to verify its compatibility (Z17DTJ or Z17DTR instead of the installed A17DTE) and clearly inform the client of the risks — the company provided no evidence that this was done;

CC Article 6.665(1) grants the client optional rights: to demand, free of charge, the rectification of defects, a reduction of the price, or reimbursement of the costs of rectifying the defects; where the defects are fundamental, under CC Article 6.665(3), the contract may be terminated and damages claimed. The Commission's practice in this case illustrates the rules of evidence: the EUR 100 towing costs were not compensated solely because a proof of payment was lacking, while the expenses of EUR 293, 165, 110 and 1,109.84 were awarded as substantiated by documentation and directly connected with the breach of contract. Where the company, after being given the opportunity following the oral hearing to submit additional objections, remained passive, the client's assertions that were not rebutted by the service provider's documentation were deemed credible.

Consequences

The practical consequences for "GarazTervis OÜ":

• to pay the client EUR 1,677.84: EUR 293 for the belt replacement, EUR 165 for the starter work, EUR 110 for the "Carzone OÜ" diagnostics, and EUR 1,109.84 for restoring engine operation;
• the towing costs (EUR 100) and unsubstantiated larger repair amounts were not awarded due to insufficient evidence;
• if it fails to comply voluntarily, the client may apply to the district court, where the dispute would be heard afresh under the same CC provisions, with the Commission's decision serving as one piece of evidence.

For the service provider, this serves as a reminder that under CC Article 6.256(3), professional activity entails an obligation to perform the contract in accordance with the requirements applicable to such professional activity — "passing" liability to the part's manufacturer does not work vis-à-vis the client. For consumers, the practical conclusion is that every expense must be substantiated by a proof of payment, otherwise it will not be compensated.

Under Article 370(1) CPC, a final judgment may be appealed in cassation within three months of the date it becomes final, and the aggregated sentence under Article 64(4) CC may not exceed twenty-five years of deprivation of liberty.

Acceptance of the appeal under Article 372(3) CPC does not entail suspension of enforcement — suspension is a separate judicial decision, refused in this instance.

Core issue

R. Jakščio deprivation of liberty sentence is being enforced in practice as of today — the Supreme Court of Lithuania (LAT) accepted the cassation appeal but dismissed the application to suspend enforcement of the judgment pending the conclusion of the cassation proceedings. The convicted person's legal situation is therefore as follows: he is in a custodial institution, while the cassation appeal before LAT keeps the proceedings open, which may end only in the quashing of the judgment, its amendment, or the dismissal of the appeal. The precise legal question: whether LAT, having received a cassation appeal under Article 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Lithuania (CPC), has the right and duty to suspend enforcement of a final judgment of the appellate instance — this is to be determined under Article 369 CPC and Article 370 CPC.

Legal assessment

Under Article 369(1) CPC, a final judgment may be appealed in cassation where the criminal law has been incorrectly applied or where material procedural violations have occurred; violations are deemed material where they restrict the rights of the accused or precluded the adoption of a just judgment (Art. 369(3) CPC). R. Jakščio's cassation appeal seeks the quashing of the August 18 judgment of Kaunas Regional Court, but acceptance of the appeal under Article 372(3) CPC — a decision of the screening panel — does not mean suspension of enforcement; suspension is a separate judicial assessment, and in this instance it was refused. An important contextual circumstance is the June ruling of the Constitutional Court, which held that the provision of the Penal Enforcement Code prohibiting conditional release for persons convicted of offences against the freedom of a minor's sexual self-determination or against his or her inviolability is contrary to the constitutional principle of a state governed by the rule of law; it was precisely this ruling that made R. Jakštis the first such convict to be granted conditional release. However, that conditional release applied in respect of a previous judgment — what is now being enforced is a newly final sentence for the sexual abuse of minors, and under Article 64 of the Criminal Code (CC), where a new offence is committed while a sentence remains unserved, the sentences may be aggregated, with the aggregated sentence not exceeding twenty-five years of deprivation of liberty (Art. 64(4) CC).

Consequences

In practical terms, the convicted person's position depends on two proceedings. The first is the cassation review: LAT may quash the appellate-instance judgment and remit the case for a fresh hearing, amend the judgment, or dismiss the appeal; on grounds of a material violation, the judgment is quashed under Article 329 CPC. The second is the enforcement of sentences: the sentence is served in practice, and if the cassation judgment alters its length, the question of reconciling it with the portion already served may arise. Of significance to the convicted person are also the measures of criminal influence under Article 67 CC: following the Constitutional Court's ruling, he was granted conditional release subject to a set of prohibitions, breach of which entails return to a custodial institution — a mechanism that has already operated in practice. For the victims and society, it is relevant that under Article 68¹(4) CC, the right to hold certain employment or engage in certain activities may be withdrawn for a period of three to seven years for offences under Chapter XXXIII, and under Article 67(2)(8) CC an obligation may be imposed to live separately from the victim and not to approach them. Point to monitor: the decision of the LAT screening panel, and subsequently of the three-judge panel, on the merits of the cassation appeal is awaited.

Under Article 7(1) of the Law on the Protection of Minors from the Detrimental Effects of Public Information, information detrimental to minors may be disseminated online only by means of technical measures — age verification, parental control, or content filtering systems.

Under Article 13(3) of the Criminal Code, a person under 14 years of age may be subjected only to educational measures, not criminal liability.

Core issue

Following the Marijampolė incident, the Government and the Presidential Office are considering not a new criminal statute, but a shift of responsibility onto platforms that create "engaging design and content." The legal question to be resolved is this: what obligations and liabilities may be imposed on platforms with respect to age restrictions for minors, and whether the existing provisions suffice — Article 7 of the Law on the Protection of Minors from the Detrimental Effects of Public Information, Article 17 of the Law on Public Information, and Article 28 of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child. The second question is whether to lower the age of criminal responsibility for minors, currently set by Article 13 of the Criminal Code. The third is whether to introduce administrative liability for parents, to be applied in accordance with the types of penalties established in Article 23 of the Code of Administrative Offences.

Legal assessment

The existing system already places the duty on the platforms' side. Under Article 7(1) of the Law on the Protection of Minors, information detrimental to minors may not be disseminated directly to them; online, it may be made available only by means of technical measures — age verification, parental control, or content filtering systems. The Description of the Marking and Dissemination Procedure approved by Government Resolution establishes three indices: "N-7", "N-14", and "S" — and it is precisely this age grading that technically corresponds to what the Minister refers to when citing the structure of the European Commission's "Kids Act." A supervisory authority already exists: under Article 9(2) of the Law, the Inspectorate oversees the implementation of the Law, examines complaints, and is entitled to issue warnings to creators and disseminators regarding violations. For breaches of the Description's provisions, liability is imposed under point 41–1 thereof in accordance with the Code of Administrative Offences, with the limits of that liability determined by Article 23 of the Code. The question of minors' own liability is addressed through Article 13(3) of the Criminal Code: a person under 14 years of age may be subjected only to educational measures. The Minister's position that earlier criminal responsibility and resocialisation centres "do not produce a better citizen" means, in practical terms, that the age thresholds of Article 13 of the Criminal Code will not be amended for now. The question of parents' administrative liability remains open — it will be discussed by the Ministry of Social Security and Labour and the Children's Rights Ombudsperson. Article 28(2) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child warrants separate assessment; it prohibits a child from creating, posting, and disseminating online depictions of a sexual nature of themselves and other children, as well as images of bullying and violence. The dissemination of a recording of violence on social networks may also be assessed under point 1 of Article 4 of the Law on the Protection of Minors.

Consequences

For platforms, the real risk lies in the duty to implement age verification and filtering systems under Article 7, along with warnings from the Inspectorate and administrative liability under point 41–1 of the Description. If Lithuania aligns with the EU's "Kids Act" direction, age restriction rules will become uniform across the Union. No sanctions for parents or minors are foreseen at this time. In schools, council-approved rules on phone use have been in force since September, and the question of a centralised ban is back on the agenda. Point to watch: the ongoing discussion with the Ministry of Social Security and Labour and the Children's Rights Ombudsperson concerning minors' liability.

Under Article 148-1(1) of the Criminal Code, systematic stalking against a clearly expressed will, which has had an adverse effect on the victim's social life or emotional state, is a criminal misdemeanour punishable by community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest.

Under Article 2(2) of the Law on Protection Against Domestic Violence, the "domestic environment" also covers persons who have been linked by marriage or partnership relations only in the past, so separation does not remove a former partner from the scope of the Law's protection.

Core issue

Individuals who, after a separation, systematically intimidate a former partner, restrict their independence, or manipulate the children face not only a "conflict" assessed in family proceedings, but also criminal liability and special protective measures under the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection Against Domestic Violence. The essential legal question in this situation is whether the specific conduct constitutes domestic violence within the meaning of Article 2(5) of that Law, and whether it meets the elements of "unlawful stalking of a person" under Article 148-1 of the Criminal Code. An important detail: the "domestic environment" defined in Article 2(2) also covers persons who have been linked by marriage or partnership relations only in the past, so separation does not in itself remove a former partner from the scope of the Law's protection. Isolated emotional conduct or mutual accusations do not yet constitute the elements of stalking — Article 148-1(1) of the Criminal Code requires that the stalking be systematic, lack a lawful basis, and occur against the clearly expressed will of the victim.

Legal assessment

In assessing the totality of the conduct, several provisions may apply depending on the nature of the acts:

• Article 148-1 of the Criminal Code — systematic stalking as a result of which a person is forced to change their place of residence, work, or educational institution, or suffers adverse effects on their social life or emotional state; this is a criminal misdemeanour punishable by community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest.
• Article 145 of the Criminal Code — threats to kill or to cause serious impairment of health (para. 1), or terrorising a person, including systematic intimidation through psychological violence (para. 2, imprisonment of up to four years).
• Article 140 of the Criminal Code — infliction of physical pain; for acts against a close relative or family member (para. 2), a fine or imprisonment of up to two years, or up to three years where committed by torture or against minors (para. 3).
• Procedural particularity: under Article 148-1(2), Article 145(3), and Article 140(4) of the Criminal Code, these acts are punishable only upon the victim's complaint, a statement by their lawful representative, a prosecutor's demand, or where a pre-trial investigation has been initiated upon the identification of signs of domestic violence.

Where signs of domestic violence are identified, the measures provided for in Article 1 of the Law on Protection Against Domestic Violence apply — immediate response to the threat, application of prevention and protection measures, and provision of specialised comprehensive assistance. Where a case ends with exemption from liability or punishment or with conditional release, the court may, under Article 67(2) of the Criminal Code, impose measures of criminal impact: an obligation to live separately and not to approach the victim within a set distance (point 8), participation in programmes aimed at changing violent behaviour (point 9), as well as confiscation of property under Article 72 of the Criminal Code where the property is an instrument, means, or result of the prohibited act. These measures are practically most significant where violence manifests not through physical acts but through a pattern of control — legal proceedings, economic pressure, manipulation of children — since it is precisely the no-contact order and the programmes that eliminate the possibility of recurring contact.

Consequences

For a former partner whose conduct constitutes a pattern of systematic stalking, the most realistic risk is a criminal misdemeanour under Article 148-1 of the Criminal Code and a protection order restricting contact with the former partner and the children. For the injured party, it is practically important to document the sequence of conduct (threats, forced contacts, the use of economic and legal procedures as means of control), since a complaint or a prosecutor's demand is a condition for criminal prosecution under the above provisions. In family law proceedings, the establishment of such acts determines the arrangements for contact with the children and the restriction of direct contact between the parties — the conflict will no longer automatically be assessed as mutual.

Under Article 417(8) of the CAO, for the offences provided for in paragraph 3, withdrawal of the right to drive vehicles for one to three months may be imposed.

Under Article 33(1) of the CAO, when issuing an administrative warning notice, a person is offered payment of half the minimum fine, or the minimum fine in the case of a repeat offence.

Core issue

A driver who uses a phone while stopped at a red traffic light faces a fine under Article 417(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO)

• EUR 60 to 90 – and, additionally, under Article 417(8), may be deprived of the right to drive for one to three months. The core legal issue is whether a vehicle stopped at a traffic light or in a traffic jam is considered "parked": under Article 2(79) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety, parking means stopping for longer than the time needed for passengers to board or alight, so waiting in a queue on the carriageway does not constitute parking, and the prohibition applies in full. The practical question is how Article 20 of the Road Traffic Rules (KET) and Article 13(13) of the Law (pursuant to Article 4 of Amending Law No. VIII-2043) apply to a driver who touches the phone screen only when the vehicle is stationary in traffic.

Legal assessment

Article 20 of the KET prohibits the use of mobile communication devices by hand while the vehicle is participating in public traffic, except when operated via a hands-free device mounted in a special holder or through the vehicle's equipment. The exception applies only when the vehicle is parked; however, a traffic light or a traffic jam does not create a separate statutory exception – the vehicle on the carriageway is still participating in traffic. The obligations under Article 12 of the Law supplement the prohibition: the driver must observe precautionary measures, and Article 20(2) of the KET requires avoiding any actions unrelated to driving – even typing messages on a mounted phone. The established offence is qualified under Article 417(3) of the CAO (failure to comply with the prohibition on using mobile communication devices by hand), with a fine of EUR 60–90. No judicial practice sources have been provided, so an assessment of precedent is not possible.

Consequences

A recorded violation will cost the driver a fine of EUR 60–90 under Article 417(3) of the CAO; pursuant to Article 33(1) of the CAO, when issuing a warning notice, payment of half the minimum fine may be offered (or the minimum fine, if the offence is a repeat one).

• Under Article 417(8) of the CAO, the right to drive may be withdrawn for 1 to 3 months; withdrawal is not automatic and depends on the decision of the authority.
• Practical advice under Article 20 of the KET: use a holder and hands-free equipment, set up navigation before departing, and for an urgent call, stop only where stopping is permitted.
• Further procedure: police officers issue an administrative warning notice or a protocol; a separate ruling on withdrawal of the right to drive is decided separately.