Legal prism — 2026-10-18

Where the driver must be identified in respect of offences under Article 416(6), Articles 420(1)–(2), and Article 426(1), (2), (4), (5) of the CAO, dishonesty by the owner entails a fine of EUR 600 to 900 under Article 431(3) of the CAO, and, in the case of a repeat offence, EUR 900 to 1,200 under Article 431(4) of the CAO.

Providing false data in administrative offence proceedings is separately punishable under Article 224(2) of the CAO — a fine of EUR 300 to 860.

Core issue

Individuals who accept responsibility for other people's road traffic violations for a fee, as well as vehicle owners who falsely identify a "driver," risk liability for providing false information in administrative offence proceedings. Such a "transfer" is unlawful, as the law obliges the owner to identify the actual driver. The legal question is resolved under Article 431(3) and (4), Article 224(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), and Article 304 of the Criminal Code.

Legal assessment

When a violation is recorded by an automated device, the owner receives an administrative directive to identify who was operating the vehicle; this procedure is regulated by Article 611 of the CAO.

• The person on whose behalf the protocol is drawn up may avail themselves of the mitigation under Article 33 of the CAO — paying half of the minimum fine or, in the case of a repeat offence under Article 417 and the other enumerated provisions, the minimum fine; however, this option applies only to the actual offender, not to an impostor.

A representative of the Police Department reported more than 90 such cases last year and almost 40 this year.

• Where forgery of a document or false information for the purpose of obtaining a document is proven, criminal liability applies under Article 304 of the Criminal Code — community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest; in this case, a witness who gave false testimony in court is liable under Article 235 of the Criminal Code (Article 581(4) of the CAO), while giving false statements outside court proceedings falls under Article 224(2) of the CAO.
• The difference in magnitude between the two risks: for a primary traffic offence, such as a violation of the Road Traffic Rules, Article 417(1) of the CAO provides for a fine of EUR 30 to 90, whereas for the false transfer of a fine under Article 224(2) of the CAO — EUR 300 to 860.

Consequences

Practical consequences for all participants:

• The actual offender remains unidentified only until officers verify the data; the police monitor social media and rely on "recurring faces," so repeat participants enter the cycle of scrutiny.
• An owner who identifies a false driver risks a fine of EUR 600–900 (up to EUR 1,200 for a repeat offence) under Article 431(3)–(4) of the CAO, while an accomplice who accepts the fine faces a fine of EUR 300–860 under Article 224(2) of the CAO.
• For the driver himself, who faced the risk of disqualification from driving, the transfer does not solve the problem: once the case is returned to the actual offender, the period of disqualification from holding a driving licence will be calculated under Article 686 of the CAO, and the original offence remains within his liability.
• If forgery of the document is successfully proven, stricter criminal liability may follow under Article 304 of the Criminal Code, which may result in imprisonment. Point to watch: the police will continue to verify the data received and monitor social media.

Core issue

For the residents of Marijampolė and for vehicle owners operating in the city, no legal obligation changes in substance — they are data subjects within this system, and the entire impetus for compliance is created by the municipality itself as data controller. On the day the system with 79 cameras begins operating, the municipal administration must have in place and in force the three elements required by law: a lawful basis for processing, a completed data protection impact assessment, and information on the surveillance provided to residents. The precise question to be resolved is whether such large-scale surveillance of public spaces with AI analysis complies with Articles 6, 13 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (the General Data Protection Regulation) and Article 14 of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data concerning the binding nature of the supervisory authority's requirements.

Legal assessment

Under Article 6(1) GDPR, the municipality's processing of video data in public spaces may be lawful on the basis of point (e) — the performance of a public-interest function entrusted to the controller; consent (point (a)) cannot realistically be expected in this context, while point (f) does not apply at all to authorities performing their tasks. The Marijampolė municipality's instruments confirm this basis in practice: the municipal administration processes personal data "in the performance of public-authority functions" or in pursuit of legitimate interests, and the functions of local self-government are grounded in Article 6 (points 34, 37 and 39) of the Law on Local Self-Government, as formulated in the municipality's procedural descriptions. Since new technologies are used — AI recognising persons, vehicles and unusual events, as well as audio analysis — under Article 35(1) GDPR the municipality is obliged, before commencing processing, to carry out a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) and, as required by Article 35(2), to consult the designated data protection officer (contact details are given in the municipality's instruments: [email protected]). Article 13(1) GDPR requires that those under surveillance be informed of the controller's identity, the data protection officer's contact details, the purposes of processing, the legal basis and the categories of recipients — in practical terms, this means information boards at the cameras and the accessibility of the controller's policies, a model the municipality already applies in its other systems. The audio-analysis function must be assessed as an additional source of risk requiring separate evaluation in the DPIA, since recital 83 GDPR recalls that security measures must be proportionate to the nature of the data and the potential harm to individuals. Supervision is exercised by the State Data Protection Inspectorate: under Article 14 of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data, the municipality is obliged to comply with its requirements, to provide information and to enable access to the data and equipment, while recital 129 GDPR empowers the supervisory authority to impose sanctions and even to order a temporary or definitive restriction of processing, including a ban. The growth in the number of city video-surveillance cameras to 115–125 units set out in the municipality's strategic plan shows that the system is a planned and funded part of municipal activity, not an incidental initiative.

Consequences

If the DPIA was not carried out before implementation, residents may complain to the State Data Protection Inspectorate, to which the municipality must, under Article 14 of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data, grant access to documents and equipment; the Inspectorate may order the suspension or prohibition of processing.

• Cameras recognising vehicle registration numbers mean that drivers are not passive bystanders — their registration data become personal data and must be processed under the same GDPR safeguards.
• A lawfully operating system creates a new circumstance for residents: their images and audio signals in public places are recorded and analysed by automated means, while the rights of access to data and to lodge a complaint with the Inspectorate remain real remedies.
• In the event of a data security breach — unlawful disclosure or unauthorised access — the municipality bears the obligation to restore security and to answer to the supervisory authority, as defined in the definitional provisions of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data.

Under Article 68(2) of the Criminal Code, for a person who has already been prohibited from driving for a criminal act of driving under the influence, the prohibition may be imposed for a term of one to seven years, and under paragraph 4 it also applies for the entire period of imprisonment.

Article 281-1(1) of the Criminal Code provides that driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is punishable by a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year.

Core issue

In the case of R. K., the court applied the special provision of Article 68(2) of the Criminal Code, which allows a driving prohibition of up to seven years — instead of the standard one to five years — for a person who has already been prohibited from driving for driving under the influence. This means that the convicted person will be unable to obtain and exercise the right to drive for seven years from the entry into force of the judgment, and the prohibition will additionally cover the entire eight-month term of imprisonment pursuant to Article 68(4) of the Criminal Code. The more precise legal question arising from this case is: on what grounds does a person who holds no driving licence and has been deprived of the right to drive incur criminal liability for repeat driving under the influence, and what penalties and measures may be imposed on such a person. The answer is determined under Article 281-1, Article 68, Article 72, and Articles 63 and 54 of the Criminal Code.

Legal assessment

The established 2.05 per mille exceeds the threshold of Article 281-1(1) of the Criminal Code (1.51 per mille); the act is therefore qualified precisely under this provision rather than under administrative liability norms. Since R. K.'s right to drive had already been withdrawn by a 2025 judgment, the court was able to apply the second sentence of Article 68(2) of the Criminal Code — a prohibition of up to seven years, applicable specifically to a person who has already been prohibited from driving for a criminal act of driving under the influence. The confiscation of the vehicle is grounded in Article 72(2) of the Criminal Code: property that served as an instrument of a prohibited act is regarded as subject to confiscation, and property subject to confiscation that belongs to the offender must be confiscated in all cases (paragraph 3). The final penalty of 8 months' imprisonment was aggregated under Article 63(1) of the Criminal Code, which requires a penalty to be imposed for each act separately and only thereafter a final aggregated penalty, taking into account the circumstances specified in Article 54(2). The procedural acceleration — the admission of guilt and consent to an expedited investigation and a shortened examination of evidence at trial — conforms to the criminal procedure regime. The choice of the most severe penalty provided for in the sanction was driven by recidivism — the eleventh time for the same act.

Consequences

The practical set of consequences for the convicted person:

• a real custodial sentence of 8 months, the execution of which was not deferred in this case under Article 75(1) of the Criminal Code;
• a prohibition on obtaining and exercising the right to drive for 7 years, counted from the entry into force of the judgment, and, pursuant to Article 68(4) of the Criminal Code, the prohibition also applies for the entire period of serving the imprisonment;
• confiscation of the Audi automobile to the benefit of the State under Article 72 of the Criminal Code;
• execution of the prohibition will commence when the convicted person has served the sentence or has been conditionally released, and the administration of the institution will, within three working days, send a notice to the executing authority pursuant to Article 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
• data on the withdrawal of the right to drive are entered in the Register of Administrative Offences pursuant to Article 68-2 of the Code of Administrative Offences.

For other road users, this is practically significant as a signal that repeat driving under the influence without a right to drive reaches the level of criminal liability, with real imprisonment and pecuniary loss. The judgment may be appealed to the Panevėžys District Court within 20 days of its pronouncement.

Temporary guardianship under Article 3.253 of the Civil Code lasts 12 months and may only exceptionally be extended to 18 months, and under Article 496(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, having restricted parental authority, the court is obliged, of its own motion, to examine the question of establishing permanent guardianship.

In Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy (27 April 2010, § 48), the ECtHR recognized de facto "family bonds," assessing the time spent together, the quality of the relationship, and the adult's role in the child's life.

Core issue

The transfer of a four-year-old Ukrainian citizen, who has lived in Lithuania for three years in a foster family, to Ukraine is not an adoption or migration issue but one of international child protection jurisdiction, which is governed not by the Hague Convention but by the earlier bilateral treaty between Lithuania and Ukraine. Under Article 30(1) of the Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and Ukraine on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters, guardianship matters concerning a child holding Ukrainian citizenship are decided by the authorities of the state of nationality, and under Article 52 of the Hague Convention, that Convention has no effect on this bilateral treaty. The precise legal question is whether Lithuanian authorities and courts may establish permanent guardianship for this child in Lithuania, or whether they must cede the decision to Ukraine, and whether the child, represented under the temporary guardianship established by Article 3.254 of the Civil Code, may be transferred to the state of origin without an assessment of the child's best interests under Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Legal assessment

The parties' obligations and jurisdiction in this situation are apportioned as follows:

• In March 2024, the Service, acting under Article 30(4) of the Bilateral Treaty, took urgent measures — establishing temporary guardianship — but failed to immediately notify the competent Ukrainian authority, even though this was mandatory under the treaty.
• Temporary guardianship under Article 3.253 of the Civil Code lasts 12 months and may only exceptionally be extended to 18 months; this term expired in early 2025, whereupon the court restricted the mother's parental authority under Article 3.180 of the Civil Code, and under Article 496(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court is in such a case obliged, of its own motion, to examine the question of establishing permanent guardianship.
• Having assessed Article 30 of the Bilateral Treaty, the court noted that it could not decide on permanent guardianship — competence under Article 30(1) lies with the Ukrainian authority; however, Article 30(2) provides that the relations between guardian and ward are governed by the law of the state that appointed the guardian, i.e., the relations between Piteris Penas and the guardians M are governed by Lithuanian law.
• Article 30(3) of the Bilateral Treaty obliges the authorities to notify the authority of the state of nationality when measures of guardianship are necessary in the interests of its citizen and the child resides in another country — the Service did so, but failed to provide essential circumstances: the child's attachment to the foster family, language, and emotional bonds.
• Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that in all actions concerning a child, the child's best interests be given priority, and Article 20 requires alternative care to be ensured for a child left without parental care; Articles 6 and 11 of the Hague Convention regulate jurisdiction over children displaced due to unrest and urgent protective measures in the state where the child is present, but their application here is limited, as the bilateral treaty takes precedence.

One ECtHR case is cited in the case-law sources: Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy (judgment of 27 April 2010, § 48), in which the ECtHR recognized that de facto "family bonds" had formed between the child and the adults who had cared for him and wished to adopt him — assessing the time spent together, the quality of the relationship, and the adult's role. This criterion is directly applicable in assessing Piterio Peno's attachment to the foster family M: three years of living together, Lithuanian as the only language the child knows, and the guardians' continuous desire to care for the child are precisely the elements the ECtHR considers decisive. Furthermore, Article 1.32(1) of the Civil Code provides that the relations between children and parents are governed by the law of the state of the child's habitual residence — and the child has lived in Lithuania since the age of two.

Consequences

Practical directions for the further course of proceedings:

• If the Ukrainian authority decides to transfer the child to another foster family in Ukraine, the Lithuanian authorities, within the limits of the effect of measures under Article 30(4) of the Bilateral Treaty, will be obliged to execute it — the child will be separated from the foster family M notwithstanding the de facto family bonds.
• The guardians M may seek to defend their position through the ECtHR case-law criteria (de facto family bonds) or bring claims under Article 3.174 of the Civil Code regarding determination of the child's place of residence, if they have such procedural standing under Lithuanian law.
• The Service may face questions of liability for failing to notify the Ukrainian authorities immediately in 2024 and subsequently failing to provide essential circumstances concerning the child's interests — this may be regarded as a breach of the duty of cooperation under the Bilateral Treaty.
• The child's removal from Lithuania will also entail changes in practical entitlements: under Article 21 of the Law on Benefits for Children, payment of benefits is terminated when the child is taken from legal representatives or when the conditions are no longer met; the rights arising from the status of temporary protection under Article 94 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens would likewise cease to apply upon departure.
• Point to monitor: the decision of the competent Ukrainian authority on the child's guardianship — whether it will confirm the transfer to Ukraine or take into account the additional circumstances of the child's interests submitted. One year after the Service's request, Ukraine has already demanded the child's return, so a decision may be expected in the near future.

Plots within the hillfort territory are assigned a conservation (protection) purpose (Art. 11(5) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage), and Article 19(4) prohibits construction works that destroy valuable characteristics.

A management plan is prepared on the basis of the data in the Register of Cultural Values and the studies required prior to design, and the works design must, before a permit is issued, undergo a heritage protection (special) expert appraisal (Art. 23 of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage).

Core issue

The Šeimyniškėliai hillfort is a cultural heritage object of national significance (unique code 1886) with a territory of 122,859 sq. m; consequently, any construction of a metal "Castle of Light" within its territory will be assessed not as an art initiative but as construction within a cultural heritage object. Such a project would require a heritage management plan, a heritage protection (special) expert appraisal, and permits issued only upon obtaining the consent of the Department of Cultural Heritage and the municipality's heritage protection division. The more precise legal question is whether the installation of steel towers (20 m and 15 m) within the hillfort territory can at all be reconciled with the prohibition in Article 19(4) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage against construction works that destroy valuable characteristics, and it will be decided under Article 23 of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage and the procedures of the Law on Construction.

Legal assessment

The hillfort complex is protected in accordance with the purposes established in Article 4 of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage — scientific cognition and public cognition; the territory of the object is inseparable from it (Art. 11(1)), and the plots within it have a conservation (protection) purpose (Art. 11(5)). In practical terms, this means that the architect M. Maziliauskas and any potential developer bear the following obligations:

• to prepare a management plan based on the data in the Register of Cultural Values and on the studies required prior to design (Art. 23(2) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage);
• to subject the design to a heritage protection (special) expert appraisal before the permit is issued, and to amend the design in accordance with the mandatory observations in the expert appraisal reports (Art. 23, as presented in source [1]);
• to obtain a permit, for the issuance of which the minutes of the Standing Construction Commission, signed by a representative of the Department and a representative of the municipal heritage protection division, are required (Art. 23, per [1]);
• to carry out construction in accordance with the requirement of Article 6(4) of the Law on Construction not to alter the living and working conditions of third parties, and also to observe the public interest enshrined in Article 52 of the Law on Construction — the protection of immovable cultural heritage and construction in protected areas.

The essential obstacle is the prohibition in Article 19(4) on carrying out, in a protected asset subject to public cognition, construction works that destroy valuable characteristics, including the formation of a new planning structure; with respect to the unexplored parts of the hillfort territory, the requirements of Article 17 also apply (Art. 19(3)). The archaeologist Dr. G. Zabiela's position in the media — that "this exception no longer applies now" and that heritage is protected "more and more strictly" — shows that one cannot today rely on the practice of the permit around the year 2000 to restore a model; this reflects the logic of Article 23(4), under which restoration is possible only "in exceptional cases" and only for objects substantiated by comprehensive research data. An additional procedural precondition is public information and participation under Article 37 of the Law on Construction when design proposals for structures of public importance are considered, while Article 31 of the Law on Territorial Planning would allow interested persons to participate in public disclosure procedures.

Consequences

The most realistic scenario: without a procedure initiated by the municipality and the Department of Cultural Heritage, the project will remain a vision — an installation worth one million euros cannot be built merely as the architect's "gift," because the basis for a permit is a management plan and an expert appraisal, not a benefactor's intention. If the project were nonetheless to be pursued, the stages would be:

• preparation of the management plan and the heritage protection expert appraisal, the conclusions of which may require amendments or may entirely reject the construction of the 20–15 m towers on plots designated for conservation;
• public information under Article 37 of the Law on Construction — the community's position, manifested in the storm of disputes surrounding the presentation, acquires procedural significance precisely here;
• if the permit is refused, the project's proponents retain the legal remedies under Article 49 of the Law on Territorial Planning to challenge unlawful administrative decisions in court.

For the Anykščiai District Municipality this is of practical importance as landowner or trustee of state land, and for the manager of the memorial museum as the administrator of the object, whose obligations under the protection agreement (e.g., the obligation provided for in Article 16(6)(1) not to erect structures that obstruct the landscape) would pass along with the object.