If the plea of not guilty were to fail, Article 60(1)(12) of the Criminal Code would allow hatred on grounds of race, sex or skin colour to be recognised as an aggravating circumstance, which would increase the sentence for both charges.
If the court upholds the prosecutor's charges under Article 170(2), the defendant faces imprisonment for up to two years, and under Article 284 the same maximum limit applies.
K. L. Menn faces liability under two articles of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: Article 170(2) for public contempt and incitement of hatred against a group of persons on grounds of skin colour, sex and race, and Article 284 for a violation of public order, with the upper limit of the sanctions of both articles being imprisonment for up to two years. According to the court's records, the charged conduct was committed in two stages: the conflict at the cash registers in February 2025 and the "Instagram" posts made that same evening, and therefore the court will assess separately both the in-person conduct in a public place and the content published online. The precise legal question to be decided by the Vilnius City District Court is whether it has been proven that the insults directed at the cashiers and the social media posts were aimed at the persons specifically because of their membership in a protected group under Article 170(2) (skin colour, sex, race), rather than being insulting phrases uttered in the heat of a conflict over the price. Additionally, the court will assess whether the conduct in the cash register zone — forcing entry into service premises, pushing an employee, demonstrative humiliation — corresponds to the elements listed in Article 284: insolent conduct, malicious mockery, and disturbance of public peace or order.
Under Article 2(4) of the Criminal Code, liability arises only where the act corresponds to the elements of an offence provided for by law, and under Article 2(3) only a guilty person is liable — this shapes the defendant's position, as she does not admit guilt and has the right to defend herself. As a person being examined, the defendant is subject to the duty to guarantee defence rights under Article 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; however, the judge removed repetitive and irrelevant questions — this reflects the court's discretion to limit defence measures where they have no evidentiary value. The court did not admit anonymous letters claiming that the defendant is disseminating case materials and writing about the prosecutor and the judge; this is consistent with Article 177(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which pre-trial investigation data may be disclosed before the case is heard in court only with the prosecutor's permission and only to the extent deemed permissible. The sentencing framework is set by Article 42(1) of the Criminal Code: for a misdemeanour, a single penalty may be imposed — community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for a fixed term — and under Article 72(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code, the instrument or proceeds of the offence belonging to the offender must be confiscated. Together with the penalty, under Article 67(2) of the Criminal Code, penal measures may be imposed — among them, removal of non-pecuniary damage, a payment into the Fund for Victims of Crime, or an obligation not to approach the victims.
Correction. The article's claim that the measures are implemented with "companies and research institutions" is incomplete: Article 8(3) and Article 10 of the statute provide that commitments are performed by engaging natural persons, legal persons and other organisations or their subdivisions operating in the Republic of Lithuania — a broader category than the two named. It is also worth clarifying that Article 8 grants the contracting authority a right ("has the right to apply") rather than an absolute obligation; however, application is possible only where all four cumulative conditions are met, including the EUR 20 million value threshold excluding VAT, which the article fails to mention at all. Finally, the EUR 100 million figure is the value of commitments converted at valuation rates, not an actual investment — the article explains this, but in the context of the headline it may create a misleading impression of direct cash flows.
Under Article 8(1) of the Law on the Defence and Security Industry, industrial cooperation applies only where the value of the contract intended to be concluded exceeds EUR 20,000,000 excluding VAT and all other conditions are met.
Under Article 10(4) of the Law, the industrial cooperation contract with the Ministry of National Defence is signed prior to the signing of the sale and purchase contract for the military equipment, and under the standard form the Supplier and the Manufacturer are jointly and severally liable for the performance of the obligations.
A clear legal position is taking shape for participants in Lithuanian defence procurement — suppliers, contracting authorities, and domestic economic actors: industrial cooperation (offset) is no longer a declaratory option but a contractually enforceable mechanism whose performance the State may demand and sanction. The five concluded contracts referred to in the ruling, with obligations exceeding EUR 100 million, demonstrate that the mechanism operates in practice, not merely on paper. The precise legal question to be resolved for each new military equipment procurement is as follows: whether all the conditions for the application of industrial cooperation set out in Article 8(1) of the Law on the Defence and Security Industry of the Republic of Lithuania are met, and in what manner such a decision is adopted and implemented under Article 10 of that Law and the Description of the Procedure for the Implementation of Industrial Cooperation approved by Government Resolution No. 558 of 3 July 2020.
Under Article 8(1) of the Law on the Defence and Security Industry, industrial cooperation applies only where all of the conditions are met, the essential ones being:
Practical consequences for the various participants:
The regulation was initiated by the drafters of the bill with the aim of creating more favourable conditions for the development of Lithuania's defence and security industry, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, by enabling these entities to obtain the necessary financing for products intended to strengthen the defence capabilities of NATO, the EU and Lithuania. The principal argument advanced is that the availability of financing would stimulate the development and growth of the industry. The accompanying documents state that, upon adoption of the law, no amendments to other laws would be required, and that no adverse consequences are anticipated, including any impact on the crime situation or on corruption; no material contradictions are reflected in the fragments submitted by the various institutions.
Under Article 108 of the AOC, petty theft or fraud where the value of the property does not exceed three sizes of basic penalties and sanctions carries a fine from ninety to four hundred euros, and the Code provides no minimum value threshold.
Under Article 2(3) of the AOC, a person is liable only where they are at fault for committing the offence, so an error established as unintentional and unaccompanied by any intent to deceive does not trigger administrative liability.
For the individuals in this story — a customer who, at a self-service checkout, selected the code of a cheaper item — the real legal situation ended without any sanction: the police conducted administrative proceedings, determined that the acts had been committed without intent, the proceedings were terminated, and the price difference was compensated. This outcome is logical, because under Article 2(3) of the Administrative Offences Code of the Republic of Lithuania a person is liable only where they are at fault for committing the offence, and under Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code fraud requires deception — an intentional intent to deceive. The precise legal question: whether a price-difference error made at a self-service checkout, without intent to deceive, can be qualified as petty theft or fraud under Article 108 of the AOC, or as criminal fraud under Article 182 of the CC. The answer: absent fault and the element of deception — it cannot, because Article 5(1) of the AOC requires that the offence be "a dangerous act committed by the offender" that meets the elements of an offence.
Assessed under Article 108 of the AOC, petty theft or fraud where the value of the property does not exceed three sizes of basic penalties and sanctions carries a fine from ninety to four hundred euros — the Code provides no minimum value threshold, so even a loss below one euro can formally constitute the elements of an offence. However, Article 2(3) of the AOC compels an assessment of fault: the police determined that the person acted without intent and had no intention of deceiving the retail chain, so the elements of the offence were not established. Procedurally, this case never reached a court — the reference to a "claim" in the circulated report is a factual error, since a claim is a document submitted to a court, whereas here the police merely clarified the circumstances within the framework of administrative proceedings. The boundary between administrative and criminal liability is also significant: under Article 5(2) of the AOC, a person is liable administratively only where the act does not trigger criminal liability; if the value of property obtained by deception were higher, Article 182 of the CC would apply — in the case of property of small value this is a criminal misdemeanour, and under Article 182(5) of the CC a person is liable for acts under paragraphs 1 and 4 only upon the victim's complaint, a prosecutor's demand, or an application by a lawful representative. In this case, the affected retail chain did not file a complaint — a security officer, after reviewing the video footage, notified the police, which itself contacted the customer. The sources provided contain no case law on similar self-service checkout cases, so the qualifying boundary between an unintentional error and deception must here be resolved solely on the basis of the text of the provisions.
For the customer, whose fault was not established, there are no practical adverse consequences — no sanction was imposed, the administrative proceedings were terminated, and the damage was compensated voluntarily. Had fault been proven, the set of consequences according to the sources would be as follows:
For the retail chain, this practice means that it cannot determine a person's identity itself and must turn to the police, and that at self-service checkouts what is most often recorded are not thefts but fraud cases — selecting the code of a cheaper item in place of a more expensive one. The chain uses video surveillance systems, stock-level analysis, and, at the self-service checkouts of some stores, artificial intelligence solutions that help detect atypical situations. This case is closed — the administrative proceedings were terminated and no sanction was imposed; the public-interest question remains only whether the retail chains' practice of reporting to the police over a symbolic loss will change after this case received attention.
Unauthorised use of a copyright object for non-commercial purposes under Article 122(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences attracts a fine from EUR 280 to EUR 600, and for commercial purposes from EUR 300 to EUR 3,500, with mandatory confiscation of the unlawful copies.
Article 192 of the Criminal Code applies only to acts committed for commercial purposes where the total value of the unlawful copies exceeds 400 times the minimum monthly wage, and provides for imprisonment of up to three years.
For the individuals discussed in the broadcast — both content creators and those who use photographs, music, or videos found online — the real legal risk is threefold: civil liability for damages, an administrative fine under Article 122 of the Republic of Lithuania's Code of Administrative Offences, and, where commercial purposes are involved and the value threshold is exceeded, criminal liability under Article 192 of the Republic of Lithuania's Criminal Code. The precise line of liability is determined by two criteria: the purpose of the use and the repeat nature of the infringement. In deciding whether a protected right arises at all, the Republic of Lithuania's Law on Copyright and Related Rights (hereinafter — the LCRR Law) will apply: Article 1 defines its scope of application, while Article 73 treats as an infringement any acts that violate the rights protected by the law. The specific legal question arising from this broadcast is: when does the unauthorised use of a work found online trigger a fine, confiscation, or damages, and when does it fall within the statutory exceptions permitting use without permission.
Article 20(1) of the LCRR Law permits a natural person, without permission, to reproduce a copy of a lawfully published or publicly disclosed work exclusively for personal, non-commercial purposes; however, that same paragraph does not apply to computer programs, electronic databases, or works of architecture. This means that downloading a film "for personal use" from an unlawful source does not fall within this exception, because the work has not been lawfully published or publicly disclosed. Administrative liability under Article 122 of the Code of Administrative Offences is differentiated as follows:
In addition to the fine, Article 122(5) of the Code provides for mandatory confiscation of unlawful copies and, in the cases covered by paragraphs 2–4, also confiscation of the means of production or equipment used to make them. Criminal liability under Article 192 of the Criminal Code is triggered where the act is committed for commercial purposes and the total value of the copies, calculated at the prices of lawful copies or originals, exceeds 400 times the amount of the minimum monthly wage; the penalty range runs from community service to imprisonment for up to three years, and paragraph 3 provides that a legal entity is also liable. Separately, Article 193 of the Criminal Code punishes the destruction or alteration of rights-management information for commercial purposes — imprisonment for up to one year. On the civil side, Article 1.138(6) of the Civil Code allows the court to award pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, and Article 87 of the LCRR Law confirms that administrative and criminal liability are established by the respective codes. It is also significant that Article 48(4) of the LCRR Law recognises the author's right to equitable remuneration, where it is administered by a collective management organisation, as inalienable and non-transferable — this limits what a user can "purchase" by contract.
In practice, the infringer faces more than a fine: mandatory confiscation of copies and, in commercial cases, of equipment entails a risk of material loss regardless of the size of the fine, while a civil claim under Article 1.138 of the Civil Code may also recover lost revenue. For a lawful alternative, one must:
For businesses and content creators, this means that using music on social networks is safe only where the platform's licence agreement covers the specific manner of use; otherwise, the commercial fine regime of Article 122(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences applies. Monitoring point: if a rights holder identifies an infringement, the first document to expect is a demand to cease the unlawful acts or a record of the administrative offence.
[TEISINIS_KLAUSIMAS] The regulation was initiated by non-governmental organisations — the Lithuanian Anti-Piracy Association, the Lithuanian Neighbouring Rights Association, the Lithuanian Cable Television Association and the Intellectual Property Protection Centre — while the draft was prepared by the Ministry of Culture, drawing on the results of a 2017 discussion organised by the Seimas Committee on Culture concerning the relationship between creators and internet operators. The aim was to create legal instruments to prevent the unlawful reproduction and public communication online of copyright-protected content, in particular the power to block websites providing unlawful access to works. The principal argument was the need to strengthen the means of enforcing copyright in the digital environment and thereby combat online piracy. [TEISINIS_PAGRINDAS] [PRAKTIKA] [TIKSLINIMAS] [PRAKTINE_REIKSME]
Article 141(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 prohibits national offices from applying additional formalities requirements other than those laid down in the Regulation, which illustrates that EU legislative acts apply in the Member States without national modification.
The persons and institutions mentioned in the news item — Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro, Albania, the European Commission and the EU Member States — operate entirely outside the scope of the legal sources provided: the instruments set out here govern the implementation of Lithuanian civil procedure and the EU trade mark system, not enlargement or the procedure for treaty amendments. The precise legal question arising from the news item is whether the "safeguards" proposed by the Commission can be implemented under the Treaties — that is, whether they require amendment of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union pursuant to the treaty amendment procedure, or whether they may be adopted by ordinary legislative acts. The sources provided permit an answer only to an intermediate question: what legal logic governs directly applicable regulations at EU level in general and how they interact with national procedure, since it is examples of such instruments that are set out here.
Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark demonstrates that EU legislative acts may directly establish both the substantive conditions and the procedures which Member States must apply without modification: Article 31 governs the content of the application and payment of fees, Article 41 provides for the Office's examination, with a two-month time limit for the applicant to remedy deficiencies, and Article 141(2) prohibits national offices from applying additional formalities requirements other than those laid down in the Regulation. This prohibition is a direct expression of the primacy and uniformity of EU law: national practice may not supplement or alter the harmonised EU procedure. The analogous logic — reflected in the news item by the Commission's aim that the new members should not "block" the system — manifests itself in EU law in the limitation of Member States' procedural freedom wherever the Treaties or regulations prescribe uniform application. The Lithuanian sources — the Law on Implementation of European Union and International Legal Acts Governing Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania — illustrate the second model of integration: EU acts are implemented by a national statute, Article 10 of which determines that, in the enforcement of a judgment of another Member State's court concerning communication rights, the missing particulars are supplied by the district court of the place of enforcement under Article 593 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while Article 27(1) entrusts practical assistance under Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 to legal aid bodies. This interplay of the two models — the directly applicable regulation and the implementing statute — is the only legal structure visible in the sources provided on which one may rely in assessing how decisions adopted at EU level reach national practice.
The practical position of the candidate states mentioned in the news item cannot be determined on the basis of the sources provided: no provision cited here governs accession negotiations, the time limits for applying "safeguards" or the restriction of financial assistance, so nothing can be asserted as to their specific rights or obligations. The only warranted conclusions concern the mechanics of EU legislative acts: if the future "safeguards" were enshrined in a regulation, they would apply directly and national offices would be unable to supplement them with their own requirements, whereas if they were enacted in an implementing statute, a separate national implementation procedure would be required. As to the legality of the "safeguards" and the procedure for their adoption, definitive conclusions are impossible, because the necessary sources — the Treaties and the instruments governing enlargement — were not provided.